The Philippines’ Sabah claim: Legacy, law and likely outcome

THE territorial claim of the Philippines over Sabah remains one of Southeast Asia’s long-standing and sensitive geopolitical disputes. Although it has largely receded from official diplomatic priorities in recent decades, it continues to surface intermittently in Philippine domestic discourse, often driven by historical narratives, nationalist sentiment or political advocacy.

In 2026, renewed calls from certain Filipino politicians and interest groups to revisit the claim have once again brought the issue into public attention. Despite these periodic revivals, the dispute today exists within a vastly different legal and political landscape from that in which it first emerged, raising important questions about its continued relevance and viability.

The origins of the dispute can be traced back to an agreement concluded on 22 January 1878 between the Sultan of Sulu, Sultan Jamalul Alam, and representatives of the British North Borneo Company. This agreement lies at the heart of the competing claims and remains the central source of disagreement. The Philippine position rests on the interpretation that the agreement constituted a lease, under which sovereignty over the territory of Sabah, then part of North Borneo, remained with the Sultanate of Sulu while administrative rights were granted to the British. Malaysia, however, maintains that the agreement was one of cession, permanently transferring sovereignty to the British North Borneo Company.

The ambiguity arises largely from linguistic and translational differences in the original documents, which were written in several languages, including Malay and Spanish. The key term often cited, “padjak,” has been interpreted differently depending on context, with some readings suggesting a lease and others indicating a grant or cession. The continued annual payment made by Malaysia, historically amounting to a modest sum to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu, has frequently been cited by the Philippines as evidence of a lease arrangement. Malaysia, by contrast, has consistently characterised these payments as symbolic cession money, not rent, and therefore not indicative of any retained sovereignty. Legal historians have similarly pointed out that colonial-era agreements often used imprecise terminology, further complicating retrospective interpretation.

Following the 1878 agreement, the British North Borneo Company exercised administrative control over the territory, which later came under direct British colonial rule after the Second World War. During this period, the Sultanate of Sulu gradually lost its political authority while sovereignty over its former territories became increasingly absorbed into colonial governance structures. The question of sovereignty over North Borneo remained largely uncontested until the early 1960s when the process of decolonisation and the proposed formation of Malaysia brought the issue into sharp focus.

In 1962, the Philippines formally asserted its claim to Sabah, arguing that it had inherited the rights of the Sultanate of Sulu following the integration of Sulu into the Philippine state. This assertion coincided with plans to establish the Federation of Malaysia, comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo. The Philippine government objected to the inclusion of Sabah, contending that its status was unresolved and that its incorporation into Malaysia would prejudice the Philippine claim. At the same time, regional tensions were heightened by Indonesia’s opposition to Malaysia’s formation, illustrating the way Sabah became entangled in wider geopolitical rivalries.

However, developments during this period significantly weakened the Philippine position in the eyes of the international community. Central among these was the application of the principle of self-determination. The Cobbold Commission, established in 1962, conducted consultations among the population of North Borneo and Sarawak to ascertain their views on the proposed federation. Its findings indicated that a majority supported the formation of Malaysia subject to certain safeguards. This conclusion was subsequently affirmed by a United Nations mission in 1963, which reported that the people of North Borneo had freely expressed their wish to join Malaysia.

When Malaysia was formally established on 16 September 1963, Sabah became one of its constituent states. From Malaysia’s perspective, this development effectively settled the question of sovereignty as it reflected the will of the people in accordance with a fundamental principle of international law. The Philippines, however, refused to formally relinquish its claim, maintaining that historical rights derived from the Sultanate of Sulu persisted.

Over the following decades, the Philippine claim was pursued inconsistently, often influenced by domestic political considerations rather than sustained diplomatic strategy. The claim was first advanced formally under President Diosdado Macapagal but subsequent administrations frequently chose to downplay the issue in favour of maintaining stable relations with Malaysia, particularly within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nonetheless, the claim has never been formally abandoned and continues to be regarded by some Filipino politicians and groups as a matter of historical entitlement.

In recent years, there have been renewed calls from certain figures within the Philippines to pursue the claim more actively. Senator Robin Padilla has been among the more vocal advocates, publicly urging the government to assert what he describes as the country’s rightful claim over Sabah. Similarly, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has faced periodic pressure from nationalist groups and commentators to revisit the issue, although his administration has largely maintained a cautious and pragmatic stance. These calls reflect a broader pattern in which the Sabah issue is periodically revived for domestic political purposes, even as official policy remains restrained. Some commentators have linked these calls to broader debates about national identity and historical memory within the Philippines as well.

A significant and dramatic turning point in the history of the dispute occurred in 2013, when approximately 200 armed followers of Jamalul Kiram III, a self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu, entered Sabah in the Lahad Datu area. Their stated objective was to assert the historical claim by establishing a physical presence. The situation escalated into a violent confrontation with Malaysian security forces, resulting in casualties on both sides before the incursion was suppressed.

The Lahad Datu incident demonstrated profound consequences for the perception of the claim. It led to a deterioration in diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, prompted Malaysia to strengthen security in eastern Sabah through the establishment of the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) and resulted in the cessation of annual payments to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. Perhaps most significantly, the episode shifted international perceptions of the claim, associating it not with a legal or historical dispute but with issues of security and militancy. This shift, in turn, further undermined its credibility on the global stage and made future diplomatic advocacy more difficult.

In parallel with these developments, attempts have been made to pursue the claim through international legal mechanisms, most notably by the descendants of the Sultan of Sulu rather than the Philippine state itself. In 2019, these heirs initiated arbitration proceedings against Malaysia, seeking compensation for what they alleged to be a breach of the 1878 agreement. In 2022, an arbitral tribunal controversially awarded approximately USD 14.9 billion to the claimants, a decision that briefly attracted significant international attention and sparked debate among legal scholars.

However, Malaysia challenged the award vigorously across multiple jurisdictions, and subsequent rulings largely favoured its position. Courts in France, including the Paris Court of Appeal, annulled the enforcement of the award, with courts in Luxembourg and the Netherlands siding with Malaysia. By 2024, these decisions had effectively dismantled the arbitration outcome, representing a major legal setback for the claimants and reinforcing Malaysia’s standing under international law. These outcomes similarly demonstrated the limits of arbitration when questions of state sovereignty are indirectly implicated.

It is important to note that, despite these legal proceedings, there has never been a formal adjudication of the Sabah sovereignty dispute by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Such a ruling would require the consent of both parties, and Malaysia has consistently declined to submit the matter to international adjudication, maintaining that there is no dispute to resolve. As a result, the question of sovereignty remains unaddressed by the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.

From the standpoint of contemporary international law, several factors strongly favour Malaysia’s position. The principle of self-determination, as demonstrated by the findings of the Cobbold Commission and the United Nations mission, supports Sabah’s inclusion in Malaysia. The doctrine of effective control further strengthens Malaysia’s claim, given its continuous administration of the territory since 1963. In addition, Sabah’s status as part of Malaysia is widely recognised by the international community, with no state formally endorsing the Philippine claim. The absence of any international judicial ruling in favour of the Philippines, coupled with recent legal developments undermining related claims, further diminishes the likelihood of a successful challenge.

Given these realities, the likely trajectory of the dispute appears relatively clear. The claim is expected to persist in a largely symbolic form, periodically revived in response to domestic political dynamics within the Philippines but unlikely to translate into substantive diplomatic or legal action. There is no realistic scenario in which sovereignty over Sabah will change nor is there any indication that Malaysia is willing to entertain negotiations on the matter.

At the same time, both Malaysia and the Philippines have strong incentives to maintain cooperative relations, particularly within ASEAN, where regional stability, economic integration and security cooperation are of paramount importance. In this context, the Sabah dispute is likely to remain a secondary issue, overshadowed by broader strategic considerations. Trade, labour mobility and maritime security concerns tend to dominate bilateral engagement far more than historical territorial questions.

While the Philippine claim over Sabah is rooted in historical agreements and continues to hold symbolic significance for certain constituencies, it has been steadily overtaken by developments in international law, state practice and political reality. The absence of a ruling from The Hague, combined with the principles of self-determination, effective governance and international recognition, all point decisively in favour of Malaysia’s sovereignty. As such, the dispute endures less as an active geopolitical contest than as a historical legacy, one that is periodically revisited but unlikely to alter the present or future status of Sabah.

Dr Richard A. Gontusan is a Human Resource Skills Training and Investment Consultant. He writes on academic, economic, political and social issues. His views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of The Borneo Post.